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BOOK REVIEWS
REARRANGING DECK CHAIRS: THE NEAR-NORMAL STATE FOR THE
NAVY STAFF
Swartz, Peter M., with Michael C. Markowitz. Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009). Alexandria, Va.: Center
for Naval Analyses, January 2010. 118pp. Available at www.dtic.mil.
For any institution adapting to change,
the dreaded “R-word” (reorganization)
has come to represent an often disrup-
tive, albeit necessary, transition. But as
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
authors Peter Swartz and Michael
Markowitz clearly highlight, reorgani-
zation has been the near-normal state
for the Navy Staff (OPNAV) over the
past several decades. Conducted under
the sponsorship of the Naval History
and Heritage Command, this CNA re-
port effectively tracks the numerous
changes in the organization of OPNAV
in response to changes both in Chiefs of
Naval Operations (CNOs) and in the
strategic and budgetary environments
since 1970.
As experienced CNA researchers,
Swartz and Markowitz have applied
their knowledge and experience in anal-
ysis, policy, and history to assemble a
highly accurate and credible compen-
dium of the mechanics of change in
OPNAV over a forty-year span. Swartz
has special insight here. As a former
Navy captain, he served on the OPNAV
staff during part of the period covered
by this report and is currently CNA’s
adviser to the Strategy and Policy Divi-
sion (N51), giving him both an out-
sider’s and insider’s view of the process
and personalities.
The study focuses on answering three
principal questions: What have been the
significant changes to the OPNAV staff,
why were these changes made, and what
observations and conclusions can be
drawn from these changes? Swartz and
Markowitz admit that the emphasis of
the study was in the “data-gathering
task” embodied in the first question.
Also, some readers may find the
“PowerPoint with heavy notation” for-
mat of the study off-putting. However,
this format lends itself to understanding
the complex structures, timelines, and
machinations of the reorganization ef-
forts of each successive CNO from the
1970s onward.
The taxonomy used by Swartz and
Markowitz in presenting and categoriz-
ing the myriad changes in the OPNAV
staff structure provides a highly under-
standable and ordered review of the
complicated and sometimes confusing
NWCR_Winter2011.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Winter2011\NWCR_Winter2011.vp
Friday, December 03, 2010 10:20:54 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Culora: Organizing OPNAV (1970–2009)
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
organizational adaptations. Especially
useful are the four “context” tables, one
for each decade starting with the 1970s,
that list by year who was presiding as
CNO, along with the relevant Navy cap-
stone documents, the Navy’s “total
[that is, financial] obligation author-
ity,” total number of ships in the fleet,
new ships arriving in the fleet, active
personnel, and new capabilities intro-
duced. Juxtaposed against the numer-
ous organizational charts in the report,
these context tables help in understand-
ing how each CNO has reorganized, not
only responding to the variety of exoge-
nous forces but also to implement his
own vision for the future of the Navy.
By recounting in detail the reorganiza-
tion that the current CNO, Admiral
Gary Roughead, has made to the staff,
readers can see for themselves the most
consequential changes enacted and, by
extension, the most consequential is-
sues facing the Navy today, in
Roughead’s view.
Swartz and Markowitz identify two
major changes made by Admiral
Roughead. First is the consolidation of
the Intelligence (N2) and the Commu-
nications Networks (N6) directorates
into a newly created Directorate for In-
formation Dominance (N2/6), a move
that underscores the critical importance
of a holistic approach to communica-
tions and intelligence, including the
emerging preeminence of cyber and
electronic warfare. The future impact of
this consolidation could be quite large,
given the issues at stake.
Second, equally as revealing has been
the morphing of the staff’s internal
think tank, “Deep Blue,” into the Qua-
drennial Defense Review (QDR) cell to
meet the challenges of the recent QDR,
and finally into the Naval Warfare
Integration Group (00X), in late 2009.
One function of 00X will be, acting as a
“special assistants” group, to provide
the CNO with direct assessments of
Navy programs and systems. Plainly,
this CNO sees a critical need to be
armed with as much information and
analysis as possible to address the tre-
mendous budgetary pressures affecting
the Navy, which pose a special chal-
lenge to the future health of the naval
force, a challenge requiring particular
attention and focus.
Where the study itself is admittedly thin
is in its narratives—which might have
been richer—of the colorful personali-
ties, nuanced forces, and institutional
rivalries that sculpted the shape of the
OPNAV staff during a very dynamic pe-
riod. Those wanting an Allisonian-like
examination of the organizational, po-
litical, and personal dynamics shaping
this change will have to wait for what
Swartz and Markowitz recommend as
next steps: an expansion of the study to
personalities, relationships, and in-
depth answers to the “why” question.
Until then, scholars of U.S. Navy his-
tory and organizational studies can be
content with this well researched, accu-
rate, and informative report.
THOMAS CULORA, Chairman, Warfare Analysis
and Research Department
Naval War College
Drezner, Daniel W., ed. Avoiding Trivia: The Role
of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2009. 230pp. $24.95
Students of American national security
policy, particularly those without the
benefit of firsthand policy-making
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